Module 6 · Topic 10
Take-over questions are numbers questions in disguise. You must spot when control (more than 33%) or the 2% creeper is triggered, work out the minimum offer price from a purchase history, read an offer timetable in days from dispatch, and test the nine-tenths compulsory acquisition hurdle correctly. The law sits in three layers: Division 2 of Part VI of the CMSA (sections 216 to 225), the Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers 2016 with its twelve general principles, and the SC's Rules on Take-overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions, which hold the detailed procedures and timelines.
9 min read6 sections
Malaysian Code on Take-overs and Mergers 2016 (P.U.(B) 356/2016) and Rules on Take-overs, Mergers and Compulsory Acquisitions (SC-GL/1-2016 (R2-2021), revised 28 December 2021, effective 29 December 2021) with Appendix 1 timeline and the 2021 FAQ, read on sc.com.my on 12 October 2026; CMSA 2007 Part VI Division 2 (ss.216-225) in the consolidated text incorporating amendments in force on 1 January 2026, cross-checked against the original 2007 text (the January 2026 amendments did not touch these sections). Fee amounts in Appendix 2 of the Rules are not used, as new fee regulations took effect on 1 January 2026. As at October 2026. Independent prep, not endorsed by SIDC or the SC.
Section 216(1) of the CMSA defines control as more than 33% of the voting shares or voting rights. Under section 218(2) and Rule 4.01, an acquirer must make a mandatory offer when it obtains control or triggers the creeping threshold, however the acquisition happens, including through a scheme or a share buy-back by the company.
| Holding before the purchase | What triggers a mandatory offer |
|---|---|
| 33% or less | Going above 33% |
| Over 33% to 50% | Acquiring more than 2% in any six-month period |
| Over 50% (statutory control) | Nothing further; the holder may buy freely |
Trap: Testing each purchase separately against 2%, or measuring the creeper from an old peak holding rather than the lowest holding in the last six months.
Takeaway: Above 33% is control. Between 33% and 50%, more than 2% in six months triggers an offer. Above 50%, the creeper stops.
Every note. Every question. One pass.
4 more sections of this note are part of Premium.
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Persons acting in concert co-operate, under any formal or informal agreement or understanding, to obtain or exercise control (CMSA s.216(2), (4)). Section 216(3) presumes concert parties unless the contrary is shown.
| General principle (Code 2016) | In short |
|---|---|
| 1 | Equal treatment of shareholders of the same class, including the control premium |
| 3 | The offeror must be able to implement the offer in full; its adviser must be satisfied |
| 4 | The offeree appoints a competent independent adviser |
| 6 | Sufficient information and reasonable time to decide |
| 10 | Offer made to all shareholders of the class for all voting shares |
| 11 | Offeree board must not deny shareholders the chance to decide |
| 12 | The offer period should be no longer than reasonable |
Trap: Believing the offeree board may reject an offer on shareholders' behalf. General principle 11 leaves the decision with shareholders.
Takeaway: Concert parties are presumed from relationships, then rebutted with evidence. The Code's principles protect equal treatment and the shareholders' right to decide.